GENERAL INFORMATION

NARRATIVE

[O] On January 28, 1998, at 0916:58 eastern standard time, an operational error involving Air Force 1 (A1), a Boeing 707, and US Airways flight 484 (USA484), a Boeing 737, occurred approximately 6 miles west of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). Recorded radar data indicate that the two aircraft were separated by 2.7 miles horizontally and 800 feet vertically. Approximately 30 seconds later, recorded radar data indicate that A1 and Delta Air Lines flight 740 (DAL740), an MD-80, were at 7,000 feet and 2.56 miles apart. The DCA Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) was providing ATC separation. The departure radar controller, a developmental controller, was responsible for A1, and an approach controller was responsible for the other two aircraft. [Recommendations] A-00-1. Increase the supervisor staffing level at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Air Traffic Control Tower to ensure adequate supervisory monitoring of Presidential aircraft as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order 7210.3, "Facility Operation and Administration," Paragraph 5-1-2, "Monitoring the Presidential Aircraft Flight," regardless of other supervisory duties. [Responses] FAA LTR DTD: 4/12/00 The current authorized supervisory staffing level for the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower is seven. However, to accommodate the number of very important person (VIP) movements, the supervisory staffing was increased to ten. This staffing level is considered to be adequate. I plan no further action on this safety recommendation, and I consider the FAA's action to be completed. NTSB LTR DTD: 6/26/00 The FAA reports that the authorized supervisory staffing level for the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) used to be seven. However, to accommodate the number of very important person movements, the FAA states that it increased the supervisory staffing level to 10. The FAA considers this staffing level to be adequate; however, the Safety Board does not agree. The letter that transmitted this safety recommendation noted the following: At the time of the January 28, 1998, incident, 10 supervisors were on staff at DCA, 9 of whom were qualified as controllers for the positions they supervised. One supervisor was on duty at the time of the incident. In May 1998, the FAA reported that four additional, temporary supervisors had been authorized as a result of the Safety Board's investigation of this incident; this brought the supervisor total to 14. However, in May 1999, the FAA reported that the temporary positions were no longer authorized and, as of January 1, 2000, DCA will again have 10 supervisors. Because 10 supervisors were on staff at DCA at the time of the incident, the Board is concerned that the current supervisory staffing level sometimes makes strict adherence to FAA Order 7210.3, paragraph 5-1-2, unfeasible. However, as the January 28, 1998, incident indicates, adherence to this policy is critical. Pending an increase in the supervisory staffing level at the DCA ATCT to ensure adequate supervisory monitoring of Presidential aircraft, as required by Order 7210.3, Safety Recommendation A-00-1 is classified "Open Unacceptable Response." FAA LTR DTD: 10/16/00 As stated in the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) letter dated April 12, 2000, the current authorized supervisory staffing level for the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower is seven. However, to accommodate the number of very important person (VIP) movements, the supervisory staffing was increased to ten. This staffing level is considered to be adequate. On June 26, 2000, the Board classified this safety recommendation as "open unacceptable" stating that it does not agree that the staffing level at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower is adequate. The Board asked that the FAA reconsider its position to increase the staffing level. The FAA has recently expanded its Controller-in-Charge (CIC) Program. The CIC is a longstanding function performed by bargaining unit air traffic control specialists to provide watch supervision for the continuous operation of air traffic control facilities when a supervisor is not available. Included in the recent expansion of the program is the task of monitoring Presidential aircraft movement. CIC's are facility-rated controllers and remain proficient in their area of operation. With the addition of a structured training program that targets VIP responsibilities and duties, CIC's have the ability to provide an equal capability when monitoring Presidential aircraft movement. The knowledge, proficiency, and expertise of the CIC's in airspace and procedures will enhance the service that is paramount in providing the appropriate coverage needed for Presidential aircraft movement. The addition of CIC's in monitoring VIP aircraft movement helps to ensure adequate coverage for Presidential aircraft movement. I believe that the FAA has addressed the full intent of this safety recommendation, and I consider the FAA's action to be completed. NTSB LTR DTD: 3/16/01 The FAA states that, as it indicated in its April 12, 2000, letter, the current authorized supervisory staffing level for the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Traffic Control Tower had been seven, but to accommodate the number of very important person (VIP) movements, the supervisory staffing was increased to ten. The FAA believes that this staffing level is adequate. The FAA indicates that following the Safety Board's June 26, 2000, classification of this safety recommendation as "open unacceptable response" and request that the FAA reconsider its position to increase the staffing level, the FAA expanded its Controller-in-Charge (CIC) Program. The FAA believes that the addition of CICs in monitoring VIP aircraft movement will ensure adequate coverage for Presidential aircraft movement. The Safety Board disagrees with the FAA. As the letter transmitting this recommendation states, when the incident occurred, there were 10 supervisors on staff at the facility, and 1 supervisor on duty at the time of the incident. After the incident occurred, the FAA added four additional supervisors as a result of the Board's investigation, bringing the total to 14. However, in May 1999, the FAA reported that the 4 additional positions were no longer authorized, bringing the total number of supervisors back to 10. Despite the evidence from the investigation that this level of supervisory staffing contributed to the noncompliance with Order 7210.3, Paragraph 5-1-2, the FAA states that a supervisory staffing level of 10 is adequate. The Safety Board does not believe that a CIC represents an adequate substitution for a supervisor nor that the CIC program is an adequate alternative response to this recommendation. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-00-1 is classified "Closed Unacceptable Action." 3

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