GENERAL INFORMATION

NARRATIVE

[O] On January 28, 1998, at 0916:58 eastern standard time, an operational error involving Air Force 1 (A1), a Boeing 707, and US Airways flight 484 (USA484), a Boeing 737, occurred approximately 6 miles west of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). Recorded radar data indicate that the two aircraft were separated by 2.7 miles horizontally and 800 feet vertically. Approximately 30 seconds later, recorded radar data indicate that A1 and Delta Air Lines flight 740 (DAL740), an MD-80, were at 7,000 feet and 2.56 miles apart. The DCA Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) was providing ATC separation. The departure radar controller, a developmental controller, was responsible for A1, and an approach controller was responsible for the other two aircraft. [Recommendations] A-00-2. Amend Federal Aviation Administration Order 7210.3, "Facility Operation and Administration," Paragraph 5-1-2, "Monitoring the Presidential Aircraft Flight," to require that air traffic control supervisory specialists aurally and visually monitor Presidential flights. [Responses] FAA LTR DTD: 4/12/00 Following the operational error involving Air Force 1, the FAA issued an interpretation of Order 7210.3, Facility Operation and Administration, paragraph 5-1-2, Monitoring the Presidential Aircraft Flight. The interpretation stated that all Presidential flights must be monitored aurally. The FAA also developed Notice N7210.488, Monitoring the Presidential Aircraft Movement, to outline the revised procedures for visually and aurally monitoring the Presidential aircraft. The following procedures apply when monitoring Presidential aircraft and are detailed in the notice: b. Presidential aircraft shall be aurally and visually monitored by a supervisory specialist(s) from departure to arrival. The air traffic manager of each facility through which the Presidential aircraft transits shall ensure that a supervisory specialist(s) aurally and visually monitors the aircraft while in the facility's airspace. The supervisory specialist(s) shall: 1. Be present at each sector/position providing air traffic control service to the Presidential aircraft from the flight's entry in the facility's airspace until the flight exits the facility's airspace. 2. Aurally and visually monitor the flight to ensure that separation, control, and coordination are accomplished. I have enclosed a copy of the notice for the Board's information. The guidance in the notice will be incorporated into Change 2 to Order 7210.3, which is effective January 25, 2001. I consider the FAA's action to be completed on this safety recommendation, and I plan no further action. NTSB LTR DTD: 6/26/00 The FAA reports that, following the operational error involving Air Force 1, it issued an interpretation of Order 7210.3, paragraph 5-1-2. The interpretation stated that all Presidential flights must be monitored aurally. The FAA also reports that it developed Notice N7210.488, "Monitoring the Presidential Aircraft Movement," to outline the revised procedures for visually and aurally monitoring the Presidential aircraft. The FAA reports that guidance in the notice will be incorporated into Change 2 to Order 7210.3, which will be effective January 25, 2001. Pending incorporation of the guidance material into Change 2 to Order 7210.3, Safety Recommendation A-00-2 is classified "Open Acceptable Response." FAA LTR DTD: 10/16/00 As stated on April 12, 2000, the revised procedures for visually and aurally monitoring Presidential aircraft will be incorporated into Change 2 to Order 7210.3, Facility Operation and Administration, which will be effective January 25, 2001. I will provide the Board with a copy of the change to the order as soon as it is issued. NOTE TO FILE: The FAA issued Change 2 to Order 7210.3, Facility Operation and Administration, which will be effective January 25, 2001. A copy of the change was faxed to Jeff Marcus at the NTSB on November 20, 2000, for closure. NTSB LTR DTD: 3/16/01 The FAA has issued a revision to Order 7210.3, Paragraph 5-1-2, that contains the requirement that air traffic control supervisory specialists aurally and visually monitor Presidential flights. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-00-2 is classified "Closed Acceptable Action." 2

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