GENERAL INFORMATION

NARRATIVE

[O] On August 6, 1997, about 0142:26 Guam local time, Korean Air flight 801, a Boeing 747-3B5B (747-300), Korean registration HL7468, operated by Korean Air Company, Ltd., crashed at Nimitz Hill, Guam. Flight 801 departed from Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, Korea, with 2 pilots, 1 flight engineer, 14 flight attendants, and 237 passengers on board. The airplane had been cleared to land on runway 6L at A.B. Won Guam International Airport, Agana, Guam, and crashed into high terrain about 3 miles southwest of the airport. Of the 254 persons on board, 228 were killed, and 23 passengers and 3 flight attendants survived the accident with serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 801 was operating in U.S. airspace as a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight under the Convention of International Civil Aviation and the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 129 and was on an instrument flight rules flight plan. 12 @(r) [Recommendations] A-00-9. Disseminate information to pilots, through the Aeronautical Information Manual, about the possibility of momentary erroneous indications on cockpit displays when the primary signal generator for a ground-based navigational transmitter (for example, a glideslope, VOR, or nondirectional beacon transmitter) is inoperative. Further, this information should reiterate to pilots that they should disregard any navigation indication, regardless of its apparent validity, if the particular transmitter was identified as unusable or inoperative. [Responses] FAA LTR DTD: 4/4/00 The FAA agrees with the intent of this safety recommendation and will include a note in the next revision to the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) about the possibility of momentary erroneous indications on cockpit displays when the primary signal generator for a ground-based navigational transmitter is inoperative. The note will also reiterate that pilots should disregard any navigation indication, regardless of its apparent validity, if the particular transmitter was identified as unusable or inoperative. It is anticipated that the information will be included in the January 25, 2001, revision to the AIM. I will provide the Board with a copy of the revision to the AIM as soon as it is issued. NTSB LTR DTD: 6/27/00 The FAA reports that it plans to include a note in the next revision to the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) about the possibility of momentary erroneous indications on cockpit displays when the primary signal generator for a ground-based navigational transmitter is inoperative. The FAA reports that the note will also reiterate that pilots should disregard any navigation indication, regardless of its apparent validity, if the particular transmitter was identified as unusable or inoperative. Pending issuance of the revised AIM, Safety Recommendation A-00-9 is classified "Open Acceptable Response." FAA LTR DTD: 8/21/01 The FAA agrees with the intent of this safety recommendation and has revised paragraph 1-1-1 of the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) to include information regarding the possibility of momentary erroneous indications on cockpit displays when the primary signal generator for a ground-based navigational transmitter is inoperative. The revision to the AIM reiterates that pilots should disregard any navigation indication, regardless of its apparent validity, if the particular transmitter was identified as unusable or inoperative. I have enclosed a copy of the revision to the AIM for the Board's information. I consider the FAA's action to be completed on this safety recommendation. NTSB LTR DTD: 1/23/02 The FAA has revised paragraph 1-1-1 of the AIM to include information regarding the possibility of momentary erroneous indications on cockpit displays when the primary signal generator for a ground-based navigational transmitter is inoperative. The revision to the AIM reiterates that pilots should disregard any navigation indication, regardless of its apparent validity, if the particular transmitter was identified as unusable or inoperative. With the issuance of this revision to the AIM, the FAA has completed the action recommended. Consequently, Safety Recommendation A-00-9 is classified "Closed Acceptable Action." ?? ?? ?? ?? 2

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