GENERAL INFORMATION

NARRATIVE

[O] On June 23, 1998, about 1601 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-31 Navajo, N711LD, and Grayhawk 06, a Navy Grumman E-2, were involved in an air traffic control (ATC) operational error, which occurred about 20 miles southwest of Bradford, Pennsylvania. Both airplanes were operating on instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plans under control of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) Bradford sector. Grayhawk 06 was northbound, en route from Norfolk, Virginia, to Wellsville, New York, and N711LD was westbound, en route from Elmira, New York, to Akron, Ohio. The two airplanes passed within 2 miles horizontally and 100 feet vertically. [Recommendations] A-00-23. Ensure that air traffic control personnel receive specific instruction in the acceptable methods for determining whether separation standards have been violated. [Responses] FAA LTR DTD: 6/9/00 On July 20-22, 1998, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted an onsite investigation at the Cleveland ARTCC in response to allegations contained in a hotline complaint to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The FAA determined that three operational errors had occurred at the Cleveland ARTCC on June 23, 1998, and that no intentional cover-up of operational errors/deviations had occurred. The team did conclude, however, that errors and deviations had gone unreported because facility management and staff specialists were misapplying National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) plotting procedures regarding target jumps and Mode C tolerances. The misapplication of NTAP plotting requirements was discussed on a national quality assurance teleconference (teleconferences are held twice a week) following the site visit to the Cleveland ARTCC. Through the teleconference, the FAA discovered a widespread misunderstanding of the procedures used in interpreting separation reported by NTAP and data provided by the Operational Error Detection Patch (OEDP). In August 1998, the regional quality assurance staff managers received a briefing on the correct procedures for interpreting separation. Additionally, on September 15, 1998, a memorandum was sent from the FAA's Director, Air Traffic Service, to all air traffic division managers outlining some of the misapplications of NTAP and OEDP and requiring that facility management teams be fully familiar with agency directives. I believe that the FAA has addressed the full intent of this safety recommendation, and I consider the FAA's action to be completed. NTSB LTR DTD: 10/24/00 The FAA states that in August 1998, it gave the regional quality assurance staff managers a briefing on the correct procedures for interpreting separation. Additionally, on September 15, 1998, the FAA's Director, Air Traffic Service, sent a memorandum to all air traffic division managers outlining some of the misapplications of the National Track Analysis Program (NTAP) and the Operational Error Detection Patch (OEDP), and requiring that facility management teams be fully familiar with agency directives. The Safety Board is pleased by the action taken by the FAA, and notes that these actions were taken after the event which prompted the recommendation, but before the recommendation was issued. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-00-23 is classified "Closed Reconsidered." 2

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