GENERAL INFORMATION

Data Source NTSB_SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation Number A-00-024
Letter Date(DD-MON-YY) 25-JUL-01
Status CAA: CLOSED ACCEPTABLE ACTION

NARRATIVE

[O] On June 23, 1998, about 1601 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-31 Navajo, N711LD, and Grayhawk 06, a Navy Grumman E-2, were involved in an air traffic control (ATC) operational error, which occurred about 20 miles southwest of Bradford, Pennsylvania. Both airplanes were operating on instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plans under control of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) Bradford sector. Grayhawk 06 was northbound, en route from Norfolk, Virginia, to Wellsville, New York, and N711LD was westbound, en route from Elmira, New York, to Akron, Ohio. The two airplanes passed within 2 miles horizontally and 100 feet vertically. [Recommendations] A-00-24. Review its procedures for ensuring that air traffic control personnel responsible for identifying operational errors understand and comply with applicable Federal Aviation Administration directives. [Responses] FAA LTR DTD: 6/9/00 Based on allegations contained in a hotline complaint to the OIG, the FAA's Director, Air Traffic Service, sent a memorandum on September 15, 1998, to all air traffic division managers outlining some of the misapplications of NTAP and OEDP and requiring that facility management teams be fully familiar with agency directives. The memorandum also required air traffic division managers to ensure that all employees understand their responsibility to report operational errors, and required facility management teams to be fully familiar with agency directives. Additionally, on February 18, 2000, a mandatory briefing item for all air traffic control specialists was issued under General Notice (GENOT) 0/08. This GENOT reiterated the air traffic policy concerning the requirement of reporting operational errors and deviations. I have enclosed a copy of the GENOT for the Board's information. I believe that the FAA has addressed the full intent of this safety recommendation, and I consider the FAA's action to be completed. NTSB LTR DTD: 10/24/00 The FAA states that the September 15, 1998, memorandum also required air traffic division managers to ensure that all employees understand their responsibility to report operational errors. On February 18, 2000, a mandatory briefing item for all ATC specialists was issued under General Notice (GENOT) 0/08. This GENOT reiterated the air traffic policy concerning the requirement of reporting operational errors and deviations. Although these actions are both responsive and welcome, the Safety Board is concerned that they may not be sufficient to ensure continued acceptable performance by FAA ATC personnel because of FAA staff and management turnover. The intent of this recommendation is for the FAA to verify that its procedures ensure that individuals responsible for investigation and evaluation of errors and other incidents are trained and qualified to do so, both now and in the future. Therefore, the Safety Board requests additional information on the FAA's training requirements for ATC facility quality assurance staff and on the process used for qualifying these individuals to evaluate errors and incidents before staff are permitted to perform these evaluations. In particular, the Board would appreciate information on any formal quality assurance courses held at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center or at other locations, the number of such courses held in the past year, the number of individuals from ATC facilities successfully completing these courses, and any future plans for formal quality assurance training. Pending our receipt of this information, Safety Recommendation A-00-24 is classified "Open Acceptable Response." FAA LTR DTD: 3/2/01 On October 24, 2000, the Board informed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that the intent of this safety recommendation was for the FAA to verify its procedures to ensure that individuals responsible for investigation and evaluation of operational errors and other incidents are trained and qualified to do so. The Board also requested additional information regarding training requirements for the quality assurance staff and the process used for qualifying these individuals to evaluate errors and incidents before they are permitted to perform the evaluations. The following responds to the Board's letter dated October 24, 2000. The FAA trains its personnel in various ways. Formal courses are conducted at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. In fiscal year (FY) 2000, eight classes of Course 50314, Quality Assurance Program Administration, were conducted at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center. A total of 118 employees completed this training. There are 22 classes currently scheduled for FY 2001, with 16 quotas per class. Additionally, Course 57600, Staff Quality Assurance Computer Based Instruction (CBI), is available for en route, terminal, and flight service personnel who are assigned quality assurance duties. The course is 6 hours and is distributed in the regular computer-based instruction delivery cycle. There is also a quality assurance component to the Operational Supervisors Course that is delivered via a network of cadre instructors to field supervisors. Each air traffic field supervisor is required to attend one delivery of this course every 3 years. Currently, the FAA is in the third year of the first 3-year cycle since this course became mandatory. To date, approximately two-thirds of all supervisors have completed this course. I believe that the training conducted by the FAA ensures individuals responsible for investigation and evaluation of operational errors and other incidents are trained and qualified to do so. I consider the FAA's action to be completed on this safety recommendation. NTSB LTR DTD: 7/25/01 On October 24, 2000, the Safety Board requested additional information regarding the training requirements for the quality assurance staff and the process used for qualifying these individuals to evaluate errors and incidents before they are permitted to perform the evaluations. The FAA responded by reporting on the various ways it trains its personnel for this task. The FAA states that formal courses are conducted at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. In fiscal year (FY) 2000, 8 classes of Course 50314, "Quality Assurance Program Administration," were conducted at the center and were completed by 118 employees. The FAA reports that for FY 2001, 22 classes are scheduled, with 16 student openings per class. The FAA also reports that Course 57600, "Staff Quality Assurance Computer Based Instruction (CBI)," is Available for en route, terminal, and flight service personnel who are assigned quality assurance duties. Finally, the FAA reports that there is a quality assurance component to the "Operational Supervisors Course," which is delivered to field supervisors. Each ATC field supervisor is required to attend one delivery of this course every 3 years. The Safety Board thanks the FAA for the review it provided of its training of ATC personnel responsible for identifying operational errors. Because the FAA's actions meet the intent of Safety Recommendation A-00-24, it is classified "Closed Acceptable Action." 1


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